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ABSTRACT: The health reform legislation passed in March 2010 will introduce a range 
of payment and delivery system changes designed to achieve a significant slowing of 
health care cost growth. Most assessments of the new reform law have focused only on 
the federal budgetary impact. This updated analysis projects the effect of national reform 
on total national health expenditures and the insurance premiums that American families 
would likely pay. We estimate that, on net, the combination of provisions in the new law 
will reduce health care spending by $590 billion over 2010–2019 and lower premiums by 
nearly $2,000 per family. Moreover, the annual growth rate in national health expenditures 
could be slowed from 6.3 percent to 5.7 percent.
                    
OveRvIew
To judge the merit of the comprehensive health reform legislation recently signed 
into law by President Obama, it is essential to understand its impact on the afford-
ability of insurance coverage and overall health care spending. Most assessments 
of the new law consider the federal budget only. For example, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) “scored” the federal budget impact of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, as modified by the Reconciliation Act (Affordable Care 
Act), finding a modest deficit reduction in the first 10 years of implementation.1
But the federal budget impact is not the same as the health system impact. 
A portion of the federal funds would be used to reduce costs for people who 
already have health insurance coverage but struggle to afford it, while very small 
businesses would receive help in paying insurance premiums. To estimate health 
spending accurately, we need to separate out the costs into new health care spend-
ing and transfers of existing spending from the private sector to the government. 
Furthermore, CBO assigned very little savings to system reform efforts, rendering 
its overall analysis incomplete.
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For our estimates, we increase the $1,600 figure 
over time with expected increases in medical costs. We 
then multiply the revised amounts by the number of 
newly insured resulting from health reform to produce 
a total estimate. Fully phased in, incremental cover-
age costs about $75 billion per year to cover 60 per-
cent of the uninsured, or 2 percent of total health care 
spending. This is comparable to Davis and Schoen’s 
projection that covering all of the uninsured would add 
3 percent to medical spending,7 and Schoen, Davis, 
and Collins’s finding that covering all of the unin-
sured would add 2 percent to medical spending.8 This 
methodology suggests that the new law will lead to a 
10-year cumulative medical spending increase of $415 
billion over the period 2010–2019. This estimate is 
shown in the first row of Exhibit 1.
Savings in Public Programs
The new health reform law contains a number of 
changes to Medicare and Medicaid payments. Many of 
these are traditional payment changes—for example, 
reductions in the amount paid to Medicare Advantage 
managed care plans to a level comparable with the cost 
of covering beneficiaries under traditional Medicare, 
or smaller increases in Medicare inpatient payments 
to account for a likely increase in productivity and to 
reduce bad debts. Our estimates of the medical spend-
ing impact of these changes come from CBO. While 
this is a good place to begin, it should be noted that 
CBO has often misestimated, or failed to estimate, the 
behavioral consequences of such changes in the past.9 
We consider all such changes, with a few excep-
tions: 1) we exempt the net savings associated with 
health care modernization (Section 1104 and Title 
III, subtitle A, of the reform bill), which is treated 
separately; 2) we omit the sections associated with 
coverage expansions, which are accounted for above; 
and 3) we omit savings from the Community Living 
Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act, which 
are a collection of premiums in anticipation of future 
spending. CBO estimates that the net impact of the 
remaining proposals in the reform law is to reduce 
Medicare and Medicaid spending by $416 billion over 
The Office of the Actuary within the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), meanwhile, 
estimated the health system impacts of the Affordable 
Care Act2 and determined there would be a small 
increase in medical spending as a result of the reform. 
But, again, this analysis is limited, since it gives almost 
no weight to proposals for improving the information 
available to providers and modifying the financial 
incentives in the current system. 
This study considers the new law, as enacted 
in March 2010, to project the impact of major health 
reform on national health expenditures and the insur-
ance premiums that families will likely pay, accounting 
for the full range of impacts the legislation is likely to 
induce. As part of our analysis, we provide estimates of 
the effect of key provisions on health spending by gov-
ernment, employers, and households. We build on our 
earlier analysis of the draft legislation, taking account 
of the provisions in the final law.3
ImPACT Of RefORm On nATIOnAl  
HeAlTH exPendITuReS
Health care reform will affect national health expendi-
tures through five major channels. 
Impact of new Coverage
Extending health insurance coverage to essentially all 
Americans will increase medical spending, at least in 
the short run. (Some argue that increased coverage 
will lower spending over time by making it possible 
to pursue more-aggressive cost-containment policies 
without risking access to care for the uninsured, but in 
this analysis we do not consider such effects.4) From 
previous studies, data are available to estimate the 
magnitude of the increase in spending. Hadley and col-
leagues, for example, estimated that each uninsured 
individual who gains coverage will incur annually 
an additional $1,600 of medical care expenses—an 
increase of 70 percent.5 The Congressional Budget 
Office estimated that spending for uninsured individu-
als, if they become insured, will increase by 25 percent 
to 60 percent.6 The actual increase will depend in part 
on the rates that are paid to health care providers for 
treating currently uninsured patients.
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the 2010–2019 period. This estimate is depicted in the 
second row of Exhibit 1.
The reduction in Medicare and Medicaid 
spending is approximately on par with the increase in 
medical costs associated with covering the uninsured. 
The net impact of covering the uninsured and reduc-
ing traditional program payments (and other taxes 
from outside the health care system) is a decrease in 
spending of $1 billion over 2010–2019. This roughly 
parallels the analysis from the Office of the Actuary, 
which estimated that national medical expenditures 
under the new law will increase by $311 billion over 
2010–2019.10 The difference of about $30 billion per 
year is very small on the scale of health expenditures 
(less than 1 percent per year), and it indicates that our 
analysis matches that of the actuary when no other cost 
changes are considered.
Our analysis assumes that a reduction in 
Medicare and Medicaid payments will not be offset 
by higher prices to private payers and, equivalently, 
that fewer uninsured patients will not yield savings to 
existing payers because of the reduced need of payers 
to shift costs onto covered patients. This assumption 
is common to other estimators and is consistent with 
empirical research.11
Insurance exchanges
Currently, nearly 13 percent of insurance premiums are 
accounted for by administrative costs.12 These costs 
range from about 5 percent in large firms and firms that 
are self-insured to 30 percent for individuals. Higher 
costs for marketing, underwriting, churning, benefit 
complexity, and brokers’ fees explain the bulk of the 
difference. 
The new reform law establishes insurance 
exchanges that will group individuals and small firms 
into larger entities and thus drive down those admin-
istrative costs. The exchanges also will minimize 
marketing costs through more transparent posting of 
premiums, facilitated enrollment (assistance with the 
application process and screening for eligibility), and 
stronger oversight of industry practices. 
If all individuals and small firms were to receive 
the same premiums as large firms or self-insured 
firms do, the costs of insurance administration would 
decline to less than 10 percent. In analyzing the expe-
rience of other countries, The Commonwealth Fund 
Exhibit 1. Major Sources of Savings Compared with Projected Spending,  
Net Cumulative Reduction of National Health Expenditures, 2010–2019
Affordable Care Act of 2010
Affordable Coverage for All: Coverage Expansion  
and National Health Insurance Exchange
New coverage utilization $415 billion
Payment and System Reforms
Traditional savingsa –$416 billion
Reduced administrative costsb –$184 billion
Health system modernizationc –$406 billion
Total Net Impact on National Health Expenditures, 2010–2019d –$590 billion
Notes:  
a CBO estimate of the effect on direct spending for non-coverage provisions net of modernization and CLASS. 
b Authors’ estimate of reduced administrative costs in addition to CBO estimate of $27 billion in administrative savings. 
c Authors’ estimate of savings due to health system modernization.  
d Rows do not sum to total because of rounding. 
Data: Authors’ estimates; The Congressional Budget Office, Analysis of H.R. 4872, Reconciliation Act of 2010, March 20, 2010, http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=11379&type=1.
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estimated that administrative costs could fall to 8 per-
cent or lower under a robust exchange system.13 We 
assume more modest savings, such that administrative 
costs fall to 10 percent of total premiums—a rate also 
assumed to remain constant over time, even though 
this implies administrative costs increase along with 
national health spending. We assume such savings 
begin in 2014, the year the exchanges will become 
operational, and are phased in over three years. The 
reduction in health spending associated with reduced 
insurer administration is $211 billion over 2010–2019.
CBO estimates $27 billion in administrative sav-
ings owing to insurance exchanges over 10 years. CBO 
assumes premium reductions of between 1 percent and 
4 percent for small groups in the exchanges, and no 
savings for large groups, for an average of about 0.4 
percent.14 We assume additional savings above this 
amount, totaling $184 billion over 2010–2019 (see 
third line of Exhibit 1).
Health System modernization
The reform law includes numerous provisions intended 
to improve the information available to patients and 
providers and the incentives facing medical care pro-
viders, and thus make medical care more efficient. The 
Commonwealth Fund has summarized these provi-
sions.15 Within the Medicare and Medicaid programs, 
these include:
payment innovations, including higher reim-•	
bursement for preventive care services and 
patient-centered primary care, bundled pay-
ment for hospital, physician, and other services 
provided for a single episode of care, shared 
savings or capitation payments for accountable 
provider groups that assume responsibility for 
the continuum of a patient’s care, and pay-for-
performance incentives for Medicare providers;
an Independent Payment Advisory Board, with •	
the authority to make recommendations that 
reduce cost growth and improve quality in both 
the Medicare program and the health system as 
a whole;
a new Innovation Center within the Center for •	
Medicare and Medicaid Services, charged with 
streamlining the testing of demonstration and 
pilot projects in Medicare and rapidly expanding 
successful models across the program;
profiling medical care providers on the basis of •	
cost and quality, making that data available to 
consumers and insurance plans, and providing 
relatively low-quality, high-cost providers with 
financial incentives to improve their care;
increased funding for comparative effectiveness •	
research; and
increased emphasis on wellness and prevention.•	
The exact amount that will be saved from these 
provisions collectively is uncertain. Partly as a result 
of this uncertainty, CBO and the Office of the Actuary 
assume only minor savings. For example, CBO esti-
mated that the major parts of the law including these 
provisions will cost $10 billion over the 2010–2019 
period, while the Office of the Actuary determined sav-
ings of only $2 billion. 
Other estimates, however, suggest that an 
aggressive approach to health care modernization 
could result in significantly greater cost reductions. 
Beeuwkes-Buntin and Cutler estimated a 1.5-percent-
age-point reduction in cost increases annually from 
significant health care reform, or more than $700 bil-
lion in the 10-year window.16 These savings would 
come from two primary sources. First, administrative 
expenses incurred by provider groups would decline 
as electronic medical records, and incentives to use 
them appropriately, are widely disseminated. The 
potential for administrative savings has been stressed 
by both provider groups and insurers,17 and they are 
distinct from the reduction in insurance administration 
noted above. Second, reform would lead to fewer and 
less-costly acute care episodes. Potentially substantial 
savings could be had by preventing certain illnesses 
from recurring through better coordination of care and 
by rationalizing what is done when a person becomes 
sick by bundling payments, paying more for quality 
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care, and sharing savings with accountable provider 
organizations.
Similarly, Hussey, Eibner, Ridgely et al. esti-
mate that savings of more than 10 percent are possible, 
largely from payment reforms like bundled-payment 
systems.18 Realizing these savings over a decade 
implies cost reductions of nearly 1.5 percentage 
points annually. A more conservative mid-range set of 
assumptions suggests that such reforms could reduce 
growth in national health expenditures by about one 
percentage point per year.
The combination of provisions in the new law 
will achieve substantial savings in total health spend-
ing. A Commonwealth Fund report indicates that 
similar provisions will slow annual growth in national 
health expenditures from 6.5 percent to 5.6 percent 
over the period 2010–2020.19 Thus, cost reductions 
on the order of 1.0 percentage points are realistic. We 
assume such savings are first realized in 2014, to allow 
time for payment changes to be designed and imple-
mented and exchanges to become operational.20
The public and private savings from health sys-
tem modernization are $406 billion over the 10 years 
(see fourth line of Exhibit 1). These savings are smaller 
in the early years but increase over time. 
Taking account of these different factors, on net 
the new law will reduce health care spending by $590 
billion over 2010–2019. Exhibit 2 shows the changes 
by year, highlighting significant savings potential as 
payment and system reforms are fully phased in.
We find that the annual rate of growth in 
national health expenditures falls from 6.1 percent 
before reform to 5.7 percent after reform. When the 
current projection is corrected to reflect underutiliza-
tion of services by the uninsured, the reform package 
lowers the annual rate of growth from 6.3 percent to 
5.7 percent, a reduction of 0.6 percentage points per 
year (Exhibit 3). 
The savings we estimate are comparable to the 
reports by CBO and the Office of the Actuary, with the 
exception that we also include reasonable impacts of 
system modernization incentives and efforts to stream-
line sales of insurance. 
ImPACT On THe fedeRAl BudgeT
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the 
reform law will reduce the federal deficit by $143 bil-
lion over the 10 years, 2010–2019. Our estimates 
of the federal deficit impact differ from CBO’s in 
two ways. First, we include savings to Medicare and 
Medicaid resulting from health system moderniza-
tion. In addition, reductions in employer spending for 
health insurance lead to increases in wage and salary 
payments, which are taxed by the federal government. 
While CBO accounted for some of this effect in recent 
estimates, further reductions in employer spending for 
Exhibit 2. Net National Health Care Spending 
Associated with Health Reform
Data: Authors’ estimates.
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Exhibit 3. Total National Health Expenditures (NHE), 
2009–2019 Before and After Reform
* Estimate of pre-reform national health spending when corrected to reflect underutilization 
of services by previously uninsured. 
Data: Authors’ estimates.
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health insurance can be expected from modernization 
and lower administrative costs. We assume that 90 per-
cent of private health insurance savings are passed on 
to employees through increased wages, which are taxed 
at an average marginal rate of 28 percent.
The net effect is a federal deficit reduction of 
$400 billion over 2010–2019 (Exhibit 4). This reduc-
tion results from several factors. As estimated by CBO, 
the federal cost of insurance coverage expansion is 
$788 billion. Savings from payment and system reform 
provisions are projected to generate $682 billion—
more than is estimated by CBO, owing to the reason-
able estimates of health system modernization provi-
sions. Our federal tax revenue projection mirrors that 
of CBO’s, though we also add in the additional revenue 
from employer savings and increased wages from mod-
ernization and lower administrative costs—projected to 
raise $86 billion over the 10-year, 2010–2019 period.
ImPACT On medICARe
Prior to reform, Medicare expenditures were projected 
to grow by 6.8 percent annually from 2010 to 2019 
(Exhibit 5). The payment and system reform savings 
estimated by CBO total $397 billion when CLASS 
and non-Medicare provisions are removed. Applying 
these net Medicare savings bends the Medicare spend-
ing curve and reduces the projected annual growth rate 
to 5.5 percent. When additional savings from health 
system modernization are accounted for, the annual 
growth rate is reduced to 4.9 percent and total 10-year 
savings reach $524 billion.
ImPACT On PRemIumS fOR PRIvATe 
COveRAge
Reducing insurer administration and modernizing 
the delivery of health care services will each result in 
reductions in private insurance premiums. Private pre-
miums might be affected by other provisions as well. 
For example, an excise tax on high-premium health 
insurance plans, set to take effect in 2018, will intro-
duce a strong financial incentive for insurers to trim 
benefits and reduce costs below a tax-free threshold 
of $10,200 for individual coverage and $27,500 for 
family coverage. Indexing this cap to the overall rate 
of inflation in the economy plus one percentage point 
will encourage insurers to seek out value and efficiency 
continually, thus placing downward pressure on premi-
ums over time.
Exhibit 4. Net Impact of Reform on Federal Budget, 2010–2019 (in billions)
Affordable Care Act of 2010
CBO Cutler/Davis
Federal Cost of Coverage Expansion $788 billion $788 billion
Federal Savings from Payment and System Reformsa –$511 billion –$682 billion
Federal Tax Revenue –$420 billion –$420 billion
Additional Tax Revenue from Private Sector Savingsb –$86 billion
Federal Budget Cost, 2010–2019 –$143 billion –$400 billion
Notes:  
a Difference between CBO and Cutler/Davis reflect alternative estimate of modernization provisions. 
b Increased tax revenue due to increased wages not already accounted for by CBO. 
Data: Authors’ estimates; The Congressional Budget Office, Analysis of H.R. 4872, Reconciliation Act of 2010, March 20, 2010, http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=11379&type=1.
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Health reform might also alter the generosity of 
the average insurance benefits offered, which may raise 
premiums for certain groups. In the current market, 
many people have coverage that is extremely limited, 
with deductibles totaling many thousands of dollars 
and entire classes of services that are excluded. Such 
people will face premium increases under reform, 
although the quality of the coverage will be signifi-
cantly improved and out-of-pocket expenses reduced.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that 
such changes will increase nongroup premiums. For 
purposes of this analysis, we exclude changes in premi-
ums associated with better coverage, since one would 
need to consider the impacts of the enhanced coverage 
and correspondingly lower out-of-pocket spending to 
be able to gauge the impact of the changes accurately. 
In addition, health reform might change the 
risk pool and thus affect the average cost of enrollees. 
Limiting age-based underwriting without providing 
offsetting subsidies to young adults would drive many 
within this population out of the insurance market. 
Close-to-universal coverage, in contrast, might bring 
more young people into the market, thus lowering pre-
miums. Because of the issues associated with changes 
in out-of-pocket spending when people move in and 
out of coverage, this effect is, again, omitted.
Total 10-Year Medicare Payment
and System Reform Savings
$397 billion1
$524 billion1
CBO
Cutler/Davis
Exhibit 5. Medicare Spending with System Savings, 
2010–2019: Before and After Reform
1 Payment and system reform savings net of CLASS and non-Medicare spending and savings 
provisions; difference between CBO and Cutler/Davis reflects alternative estimate of 
modernization.
Data: Authors’ estimates; The Congressional Budget Office, Analysis of H.R. 4872, Reconciliation 
Act of 2010, March 20, 2010, http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=11379&type=1.
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We estimate the impact of insurance exchanges 
and system reform on average premiums using a 
method analogous to the one proposed above. In 
particular, we consider how reductions in administra-
tive loads and more-efficient care delivery will affect 
average market premiums. The basis for the premium 
estimates is the average employer premium in 2006, 
as determined by the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey.21 This premium is then trended forward using 
the projected growth of premiums under the different 
scenarios.
Exhibit 6 shows the premium estimates. Without 
reform, premiums are expected to increase from 
$13,305 in 2010 to $21,458 in 2019. Relative to this 
increase, premiums under reform increase only three-
quarters as much. By 2019, family premiums are nearly 
$2,000 lower. Adding reductions in out-of-pocket 
costs and lower taxes for Medicare and Medicaid will 
result in estimated savings for the typical family of 
over $2,500 that year. Again, these are conservative 
estimates: a recent analysis by the Business Roundtable 
prepared by Hewitt, for example, found that such leg-
islative reforms could potentially reduce the trend line 
in employment-based health care spending by about 
$3,000 per employee by 2019.22
Exhibit 6. Estimated Annual Premiums 
Before and After Reform, 2019
Data: Authors’ estimates.
2019 After reform2019 Baseline2010 Baseline
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Explaining the Differences with Other Estimates
The estimated health system savings we present are larger than those forecast by the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Office of the Actuary, 
which are similar to each other. The common assessments of CBO and the CMS actuary are not 
surprising, since most of the evidence upon which they are based comprises peer-reviewed studies that 
utilize carefully controlled comparison groups (either randomized trials or the natural equivalent). Within 
that genre, the dominant published themes are the inexorable nature of technology-led medical care 
cost increases, and the resulting need for unalterable demand- or supply-side constraints to confront 
that trend.
Although there is significant evidence in the literature that medical care providers are responsive to 
financial incentives,23 there is not much evidence in the published literature on policy reforms short 
of severe constraints that save large amounts of money. And for every study that shows savings from 
baseline, there is another study that does not. Thus, the common assessment is that there is little 
efficacious that can be done.
There is, however, a less formal, but no less important, literature that sees the world very differently. 
Business scholars, including Michael Porter and Elizabeth Teisberg, and Clay Christenson, Jerome 
Grossman, and Jason Hwang, all note the enormous inefficiency in health care relative to other industries: 
excessive administrative spending, wasted time and money, and resources spent not reducing costs but 
simply passing them along to others.24 These scholars highlight the enormous potential for productivity 
improvement that reform can drive if it makes health care operate more like other industries.
Through their experiences, health care practitioners reach a similar conclusion. Physicians on the 
frontlines of medicine, including Guy Clifton, Arthur Garson, Atul Gawande, and Arnold Relman, see the 
waste that exists and hold a common view on why it exists—principally, misaligned incentives.25 They 
show how health care would be better and cheaper were it not for a health care system that discourages 
such improvements. Echoing the story of misaligned incentives are journalistic accounts showing how 
the health system fails patients, physicians, and society as a payer. Each case cries out for reforms that 
would change the underlying perverse incentives.26
A number of case studies lend support for the potential of reform. The experiences of Geisinger Health 
System, HealthPartners, Denver Health, and other health care delivery organizations demonstrate that 
health can be improved and costs lowered.27 They also point to the components that are most critical 
for system improvement. While these studies are often published in the professional literature, their 
authors do not employ the careful comparison groups that would make the results compelling to the 
most skeptical reviewers. Thus, case study findings are not given as much emphasis as they otherwise 
might.
While views differ as to appropriate evidence standards, the situation we analyze is one where there are 
essentially no clinical trials and where effects of multiple large policy changes may differ substantially 
from the effects of small trials of single interventions. In such a situation, it is imperative to cast a wider 
net than traditional evidence standards do. Our decision to be more inclusive in the use of evidence is 
the primary reason why our results diverge from those of CBO and the CMS Office of the Actuary.
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COnCluSIOn
The new health reform law introduces a range of pay-
ment and delivery system changes likely to result 
in a significant slowing of health care cost growth. 
First, the law calls for the creation of health insurance 
exchanges that offer a choice of plans and the abil-
ity, for the first time, to truly compare plan premiums. 
The exchanges will have authority to reject plans with 
excessive premium increases and to set caps on insur-
ance profits and overhead of no more than 15 percent 
of premiums for large firms and 20 percent of the 
premiums for small firms and individuals, producing 
savings to employers and workers that might reach 15 
percent to 20 percent by 2019. 
The law also begins to change how providers 
are paid and care is delivered, so that they are rewarded 
not for the volume of services they provide but for the 
value they offer. It accelerates the testing, adoption, 
and spread of innovative payment methods to control 
growth in volume of services. The law also includes 
extensive provisions to report data on quality and cost 
and to enhance choice. Finally, the law directs invest-
ments in primary and preventive care, among other 
changes, that have the potential to yield substantial 
savings. 
In addition to significant payment and delivery 
system reform, the Affordable Care Act will extend 
coverage to an estimated 32 million previously unin-
sured Americans by 2019. Improving access to care 
should return substantial improvement in overall 
population health, increase workforce productivity, 
and reduce the significant financial risk uninsured and 
underinsured individuals and families now face in the 
unreformed market.
Even with these improvements in coverage, we 
estimate that the combination of provisions in the new 
law will save $590 billion or more in national health 
spending over 2010–2019 and lower premiums by 
nearly $2,000 per family. The annual growth rate in 
national health expenditures will be slowed from 6.3 
percent to 5.7 percent.
Congress and the President have enacted a his-
toric health care reform law that will help ensure that 
all families are able to get the care they need, as well as 
financial security and relief from rising premiums. The 
legislation is a significant first step toward bending the 
health care cost curve for the federal government and 
families, and it will yield real economic benefits.
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